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Abstract—At present, adversarial attacks are designed in a
task-specific fashion. However, for downstream computer vision
tasks such as image captioning, image segmentation etc., the
current deep learning systems use an image classifier like VGG16,
ResNet50, Inception-v3 etc. as a feature extractor. Keeping this
in mind, we propose Mimic and Fool, a task agnostic adversarial
attack. Given a feature extractor, the proposed attack finds an
adversarial image which can mimic the image feature of the
original image. This ensures that the two images give the same (or
similar) output regardless of the task. We randomly select 1000
MSCOCO validation images for experimentation. We perform
experiments on two image captioning models, Show and Tell,
Show Attend and Tell and one VQA model, namely, end-to-end
neural module network (N2NMN). The proposed attack achieves
success rate of 74.0%, 81.0% and 89.6% for Show and Tell,
Show Attend and Tell and N2NMN respectively. We also propose
a slight modification to our attack to generate natural-looking
adversarial images. In addition, it is shown that the proposed
attack also works for invertible architecture. Since Mimic and
Fool only requires information about the feature extractor of the
model, it can be considered as a gray-box attack.
Index Terms—Adversarial Attack, Task agnostic method, Vi-
sion and Language Systems, Deep Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks have shed light on the vulnerability of
several state-of-the-art deep learning systems across varied
tasks such as image classification, object detection, image seg-
mentation etc. [1]–[4]. Recently, adversarial attacks were also
proposed for multimodal tasks involving vision and language
like image captioning and visual question answering (VQA)
[5], [6]. Usually, these attacks fall under two categories: white-
box and black-box. In white-box attack, the adversary has
complete information about the model and its parameters.
Whereas in black-box attack, the adversary has no information
about the model that it wants to attack. Black-box attacks
[7] are possible due to the transferability phenomenon of
adversarial examples. Liu et al. [8] show that the adversarial
examples designed for one image classification model can be
transferred successfully to other classification models as well.
Similarly, Xu et al. [6] show transferability of adversarial
images between two state-of-the-art VQA models. However,
the present-day adversarial attacks are task-specific in nature
since a task-specific adversarial loss function is optimized to
generate adversarial examples.
On the other hand, the current deep learning systems use
output from intermediate layers of convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) based image classification models (e.g. ResNet50
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Fig. 1. Examples of Mimic and Fool. The first two rows show the original
and adversarial images along with the predicted captions by Show and Tell
and Show Attend and Tell respectively. The last row shows original and
adversarial image for N2NMN (Q, P denote the question and the predicted
answer respectively).
[9], VGG16 [10], Inception-v3 [11] etc.) as a feature for the
input image. The rationale behind this approach is that the
discriminative features learned by these classifiers are useful
for other vision tasks as well. Hence, it is more beneficial
to use these features instead of learning them from scratch.
As a result, the aforementioned image classifiers function
as feature extractors. Some deep learning systems also fine-
tune the parameters of the feature extractors during training
to make the image feature more suitable for the task in
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2hand. However, fine-tuning is usually done if large amount
of training data is available. Although using deep CNN-based
image features give significant advantage to the present-day
models, they have their own set of drawbacks. CNN-based
feature extractors are known to be non-invertible [12], [13].
Mahendran and Vedaldi [13] show that AlexNet [14] maps
multiple images to the same 1000-dimensional logits. These
images are thus indistinguishable from the viewpoint of the
last fully connected layer of AlexNet.
In this paper, we propose Mimic and Fool, a task ag-
nostic adversarial attack, which exploits the non-invertibility
of CNN-based feature extractors to attack the downstream
model. Given a model and its feature extractor, the proposed
attack is based on the simple hypothesis that if two images
are indistinguishable for the feature extractor then they will
be indistinguishable for the model as well. In other words,
attacking the feature extractor by finding two indistinguishable
images is equivalent to hacking the eyes of the model. As an
example, consider an encoder-decoder architecture like Show
and Tell [15], if we can successfully find two images which
are mapped to the same feature by the encoder, then the two
images will generate same (or similar) caption regardless of
the decoder architecture. Thus to attack any model, attacking
its feature extractor suffices. Based on this insight, Mimic and
Fool finds an adversarial image which can mimic the feature of
the original image thereby fooling the model. Figure 1 shows
examples of Mimic and Fool on two captioning models: Show
and Tell [15], Show Attend and Tell [16] and one VQA model:
end-to-end neural module network (N2NMN) [17].
Since Mimic and Fool only requires the fine-tuned weights
of the feature extractor to attack the model, it can be thought
of as a gray-box attack. In fact, if a model does not fine-
tune its feature extractor, Mimic and Fool can function as
a black-box attack. This is because the number of possible
feature extractors is limited. Hence, an adversary can generate
an adversarial image per feature extractor knowing that one
of these images is bound to fool the model. Furthermore,
Mimic and Fool is extremely fast and requires less computing
resources since only the feature extractor needs to be loaded
in the memory instead of the model.
We perform experiments on two tasks: image captioning
and visual question answering (VQA). We randomly choose
1000 MSCOCO [18] validation images and study the proposed
attack on three models: Show and Tell, Show Attend and
Tell, and N2NMN. We get 5208 image-question pairs from
VQA v2.0 dataset [19] for the 1000 selected images. We
choose these three models since they use different feature
extractors. Show and Tell uses fully connected features from
Inception-v3, Show Attend and Tell uses convolutional layer
features from VGG16 and N2NMN uses features from a
residual network [9]. Thus the three feature extractors vary
from shallow to very deep helping us to validate our proposed
attack for different types of feature extractors. We consider
our attack successful if the model gives the same output for
original and adversarial image.
A. Contributions of this work
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) We
introduce the notion of a task agnostic attack. The proposed
task agnostic attack, Mimic and Fool, achieves success rate of
74.0%, 81.0% and 89.6% for Show and Tell, Show Attend
and Tell, N2NMN respectively. The high success rate for the
three models validates our hypothesis that attacking the feature
extractor suffices and also shows that the proposed attack
works for different feature extractors. For image captioning
models, we also compute the BLEU [20] and METEOR [21]
score for the failure cases to show that even though the original
and adversarial captions do not match exactly for these cases,
they are very similar to each other. (ii) We also propose a
modified version of our attack to generate natural-looking
adversarial images. In the modified version, we start with a
fixed natural image and restrict the amount of noise that can
be added to the image. We use the same starting image for
both the captioning models. Even in this restricted setting,
the proposed attack achieves decent success rate. This shows
that, by adding imperceptible noise to the fixed image, it is
possible to find an adversarial image which can mimic image
feature of any arbitrary image. This result is intriguing as it
suggests that the feature extractors are very chaotic in nature.
(iii) Since Mimic and Fool is task agnostic, while attacking
a VQA model like N2NMN we need to run the attack for
every image instead of every image-question pair. This is
a huge advantage in terms of time saved for the adversary.
The same will hold true for any future tasks which take
multiple modalities as input with image being one of the
modalities. (iv) At first glance, it seems that an invertible
feature extractor will be resistant to the proposed attack.
However, we show that the proposed attack also works for
invertible architecture [22]. This shows that such architectures,
despite being invertible, assign similar features to dissimilar
images. Hence, invertibility is not a sufficient condition to
safeguard the models against the proposed attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we explain the proposed attack in detail and then we specify
the training details and the hyperparameters used for the
present work. In Section III, we analyze the results of Mimic
and Fool on the three models. We also analyze the results
of the proposed variant of Mimic and Fool on the two
captioning models; Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell.
Furthermore, we study the proposed variant on an invertible
architecture. Finally in Section IV, we give conclusions and
related future work.
II. METHOD
A. Proposed Attack
In this section, we describe the proposed attack, Mimic and
Fool, and One Image Many Outputs (OIMO) which is able
to generate natural looking adversarial images. Since both the
attacks are task agnostic, we describe the attack in terms of
the feature extractor instead of the model.
1) Mimic and Fool: Let f : Rm×n×3 −→ Rd denote the
feature extractor of the model. Hence, d will be 14×14×1024
if we extract conv4 features from ResNet101 and d will be
32048 if we use output of average pooling layer of Inception-
v3 as image feature.
Let Iorg ∈ [0, 255]m×n×3 denote the original image. Given
Iorg and a feature extractor f , our goal is to find an adversarial
image Iadv ∈ [0, 255]m×n×3 which can mimic the image
features of Iorg. We model this task as a simple optimization
problem given by
min
I
‖f(trunc(I))− f(Iorg)‖22
d
(1)
where ‖.‖2 denotes `2−norm and trunc is truncating func-
tion which ensures that the intensity values lie in the range
[0, 255]. Although I = Iorg is a solution to the above opti-
mization problem, it is highly unlikely that the algorithm will
converge to this solution. This is because convolutional neural
networks discard significant amount of spatial information as
we go from lower to higher layers. Mahendran and Vedaldi
[13] show that the amount of invariance increases from lower
to higher layer of AlexNet and regularizers like total variation
(TV) are needed to reconstruct the original image from higher
layer features of AlexNet. We start with a zero-image and run
the proposed attack for maxiter iterations and return the final
truncated image trunc(I) as Iadv .
Some feature extractors such as Inception-v3 require the
intensity values of the input image to be in the range [−1, 1].
In such a case, let I ′org ∈ [−1, 1]m×n×3 be the scaled original
image i.e.
I ′org = 2(Iorg/255)− 1 (2)
For this case, we modify the optimization problem defined in
Equation 1 as follows
min
I
∥∥f(tanh(I))− f(I ′org)∥∥22
d
(3)
where tanh ensures that the input to feature extractor lies
within the required range. We run the attack for maxiter
iterations and rescale the final image tanh(I) to get Iadv i.e.
Iadv = 255
(
tanh(I) + 1
2
)
(4)
2) One Image Many Outputs: In One Image Many Outputs
(OIMO), we start with an image Istart ∈ [0, 255]m×n×3
instead of starting with zero-image. The image Istart is kept
fixed throughout the experiment. In OIMO, our goal is to
modify Istart so as to mimic the feature of Iorg. Equation
1 is modified as follows
min
δ
‖f(trunc(Istart + δ))− f(Iorg)‖22
d
(5)
Similar to Chen et al. [5], we modify the Equation 3 as
follows
min
δ
∥∥f(tanh(I ′′start + δ))− f(I ′org)∥∥22
d
(6)
where I ′′start = arctanh(λI
′
start), I
′
start ∈ [−1, 1]m×n×3
is the scaled starting image, λ is set to 0.9999 to ensure
invertibility of tanh, δ ∈ Rm×n×3 is the learnable parameter.
For this attack, we reduce the value of maxiter and initial
learning rate to ensure that Iadv looks very similar to Istart.
Similar to Mimic and Fool, after running the attack for
maxiter iterations, Iadv for Equation 5 is trunc(Istart + δ).
For Equation 6, Iadv is given by the following equation
Iadv = 255
(
tanh(I ′′start + δ) + 1
2
)
(7)
We name the proposed attack One Image Many Outputs since
all the adversarial images look very similar to Istart.
B. Implementation Details
As stated earlier, we study the proposed attack for two
image captioning models; Show and Tell, Show Attend and
Tell and one VQA model, namely, N2NMN. We train the
N2NMN model on VQA v2.0 dataset for 95K iterations with
expert policy followed by 65K iterations in policy search after
cloning stage using the original source code1. The trained
N2NMN has 61.72% accuracy on VQAv2 test-dev set. For
Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell, we use already
available trained models2,3.
Show and Tell uses 2048-dimensional feature from
Inception-v3, Show Attend and Tell uses 14×14×512 feature
map from VGG16, N2NMN uses output of res5c layer from
ResNet-152 as image feature. The input images are of size
299×299×3, 224×224×3, 448×448×3 for Inception-v3,
VGG16 and ResNet-152 respectively. The trained Show and
Tell, Show Attend and Tell fine-tune their respective feature
extractors whereas N2NMN does not use fine-tuning.
For Mimic and Fool, we set maxiter to 1000, 1000 and
2000 for Inception-v3, VGG16 and ResNet-152 respectively.
The initial learning rate is set to 0.025, 0.025 and 0.0125
for Inception-v3, VGG16 and ResNet-152 respectively. For
One Image Many Outputs, we set maxiter to 300, 500 and
set the initial learning rate to 0.0125 for Inception-v3 and
VGG16. We use Adam [23] as the optimizer and Keras [24]
for implementing the proposed attacks. All experiments are
done on a single 11 GB GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
III. RESULTS
For studying the two proposed attacks, 1000 MSCOCO
validation images are randomly selected. For the 1000 selected
images, there are 5208 image-question pairs in VQA v2.0
dataset. The proposed attack is considered to be successful
if the model gives the same output for the original and the ad-
versarial image. Hence for image captioning, the two captions
need to be exactly the same for the attack to be successful.
In the following subsections, we analyze the behavior of the
two proposed attacks on the three models: N2NMN, Show and
Tell and Show Attend and Tell.
1https://github.com/ronghanghu/n2nmn
2https://github.com/KranthiGV/Pretrained-Show-and-Tell-model
3https://github.com/DeepRNN/image captioning
4Task Model Feature Extractor Success Rate Average Time for 1000 iterations
Image Captioning
Show and Tell Inception-v3 74.0 % 25.35 sec
Show Attend and Tell VGG16 81.0 % 15.56 sec
VQA N2NMN ResNet-152 89.6 % 72.98 sec
TABLE I
SUCCESS RATE OF Mimic and Fool
A. Results for Mimic and Fool
Table I shows the success rate of Mimic and Fool for the
three models. For N2NMN, out of 5208 image question pairs,
Mimic and Fool is successful for 4665 image question pairs.
This yields success rate of 89.6%. The high success rate shows
that it is possible to mimic features extracted from a very deep
network like ResNet-152 as well. Since Mimic and Fool is
task-agnostic, we need to run the proposed attack at image
level instead of image-question pair level. Hence, we only
need to run the attack 1000 times instead of 5208 times. This
is a huge advantage since it results in a drastic reduction
in time. The advantage will be even more pronounced for
any future tasks which have multiple modalities as input with
image (or video) being one of the modalities. Figure 2 shows
the predicted answer by N2NMN for different image-question
pairs. From Figure 2, we can see that a single adversarial
image suffices for three image-question pairs.
Fig. 2. Example of Mimic and Fool for N2NMN. Single adversarial image
suffices for three image-question pairs. Q and P denote the question and the
predicted answer respectively.
As we can see from Table I, Mimic and Fool is very fast. The
attack only takes around 25 seconds for generating adversarial
images for Show and Tell. The time taken for Show, Attend
and Tell is even less since VGG16 is a shallower network. The
proposed attack achieves success rate of 74.0% and 81.0% for
Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell respectively. This is
especially encouraging result since generating exactly the same
caption for an adversarial image is a very challenging task.
This is because, as observed by Chen et al. [5], the number of
possible captions are infinite which makes a captioning system
harder to attack than an image classifier. Our results show
that in order to generate the same caption, it suffices to attack
just the encoder of the captioning model. This validates our
initial hypothesis that in order to attack any model, attacking
its feature extractor suffices. For the unsuccessful cases, the
predicted captions for original and adversarial images are very
similar. Figure 4 shows two successful and one unsuccessful
examples of Mimic and Fool for Show and Tell and Show
Attend and Tell. As we can see from Figure 4 that for the
unsuccessful cases, the predicted captions for the original and
adversarial images have a large amount of overlap. We also
calculate the BLEU and METEOR score, using the pipeline
provided by Sharma et al. [25], for unsuccessful adversarial
cases as shown in Table II. We use the predicted caption for
the original image as reference while calculating these metrics.
B. Results for One Image Many Outputs
The main idea behind One Image Many Outputs is to
generate natural-looking adversarial images. We randomly
choose an image from MSCOCO training set as the starting
image. Figure 3 shows the starting image (Istart) for One
Image Many Outputs along with the predicted captions of
Show And Tell and Show Attend and Tell.
Fig. 3. Istart for One Image Many Outputs and the predicted captions.
In One Image Many Outputs, we reduce the value of
maxiter and the initial learning rate to ensure that the ad-
versarial image Iadv looks very similar to Istart. Reduction
in maxiter results in even faster running time than Mimic
and Fool. For both the captioning models, One Image Many
Outputs takes under 10 seconds per image.
Table III shows the success rate of One Image Many Outputs
for Show and Tell and Show Attend and Tell. As we can see
from Table I and Table III, the success rate reduces for One
Image Many Outputs in comparison to Mimic and Fool. This is
intuitive since in One Image Many Outputs, the reduced value
of maxiter and initial learning rate allows for less adversarial
noise.
Considering this reduction and the fact that the attack is
successful only when there is an exact match of captions, the
success rate of One Image Many Outputs is impressive. Similar
to Mimic and Fool, we find that for the unsuccessful cases of
One Image Many Outputs, the captions predicted by the model
for the adversarial and original images are very similar to each
5Fig. 4. Examples of Mimic and Fool. For both the captioning models, the figure shows two successful and one unsuccessful original and adversarial image
along with the predicted captions.
Fig. 5. Examples of One Image Many Outputs. For both the captioning models, the figure shows two successful and one unsuccessful original and adversarial
image along with the predicted captions. For adversarial images, the captions within brackets are predicted by the other captioning model i.e. for Show and
Tell, the captions within brackets are captions predicted by Show Attend and Tell and vice-versa.
other. Table II shows the BLEU and METEOR score for the
unsuccessful cases of One Image Many Outputs. This result
shows that even when Iadv is very similar to Istart, it can
mimic features of an arbitrary image. This shows that CNN-
6Model Attack BLEU-1 BLEU-2 BLEU-3 BLEU-4 METEOR
Show and Tell
Show-and-Fool
Mimic and Fool
OIMO
0.560
0.597
0.593
0.394
0.464
0.459
0.266
0.348
0.350
0.205
0.264
0.270
0.301
0.320
0.322
Show Attend and Tell
Mimic and Fool
OIMO
0.639
0.594
0.530
0.468
0.421
0.359
0.333
0.284
0.368
0.336
TABLE II
BLEU AND METEOR SCORES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL CASES. OIMO REFERS TO One Image Many Outputs.
Model Success Rate
Show and Tell 56.9 %
Show Attend and Tell 50.3 %
TABLE III
SUCCESS RATE OF One Image Many Outputs
based feature extractors are chaotic in nature.
Figure 5 shows two successful and one unsuccessful exam-
ples of One Image Many Outputs for Show and Tell and Show
Attend and Tell. For the adversarial images in Figure 5, the
captions within brackets are the predicted captions by the other
captioning model i.e. the captioning model which is not under
attack. As we can see from Figure 5, all the six adversarial
images are very similar to the starting image, Istart. Also for
the unsuccessful cases, the original and adversarial captions
have a large amount of overlap and are semantically similar.
In Figure 5, we see that for Show and Tell, the captions
within brackets, i.e. the captions predicted by Show Attend
and Tell, for the three adversarial images are the same.
Similarly for Show Attend and Tell, although the captions
within the brackets (captions predicted by Show and Tell) are
different, they are semantically similar. Moreover, for both
the captioning models, all the captions within brackets are
relevant captions for the starting image, Istart. In fact, we
find that when the 1000 adversarial images for Show And Tell
are given as input to Show Attend and Tell, there are only 15
unique captions. All these 15 captions are relevant captions for
Istart. Similarly, when the 1000 adversarial images for Show
Attend and Tell are given as input to Show and Tell, there are
only 82 unique captions, most of which are relevant to Istart.
We find that Show and Tell generates irrelevant captions for
Istart only for 32 out of 1000 adversarial images. Since the
two captioning models use different feature extractors, this
result shows that the proposed attack is very dependent on
the feature extractor. In other words, ensuring that the two
images are indistinguishable for one feature extractor does not
ensure that they will be indistinguishable for another feature
extractor. More examples of the two proposed attacks can be
seen at https://www.isical.ac.in/∼utpal/resources.php.
C. Comparison with task specific attack
In this section, we compare our proposed attack, OIMO,
with a white-box attack for Show and Tell, namely Show-and-
Fool [5]. Similar to OIMO, we start with Istart and run the
attack, using the official implementation4, in order to generate
4https://github.com/IBM/Image-Captioning-Attack
adversarial captions. Show-and-Fool achieves a success rate of
95.1% and takes around 190 seconds per image. In contrast,
OIMO takes around 8 seconds per image for Show and Tell.
Although our proposed attack achieves a lower success rate,
we can see from Table II that for unsuccessful cases, OIMO
achieves higher BLEU and METEOR score than Show-and-
Fool. We find that for the adversarial images generated by
Show-and-Fool, Show Attend and Tell generates only 11
unique captions, all of which are relevant captions for Istart.
Chen et al. [5] study the transferability of Show-and-Fool
between the captioning models, however in their study, the
two captioning models use the same feature extractor.
D. OIMO for invertible architecture
Recently, Jacobsen et al. [22] propose a deep invertible
architecture, i-RevNet which learns a one-to-one mapping
between image and its feature. These networks achieve im-
pressive accuracy on ILSVRC-2012 [26]. For experimentation,
we choose bijective i-RevNet which takes images of size
224 × 224 × 3 as input and the corresponding feature is of
size 3072 × 7 × 7. We use the pretrained i-RevNet provided
in the official implementation5 to test our proposed attack,
One Image Many Outputs. We randomly choose 100 correctly
classified images belonging to 41 different classes from the
validation set of ILSVRC-2012. Furthermore, we choose a
starting image, Istart, belonging to a different class. We
also restrict the search space for adversarial images using
the clipping function ClipIstart, (i.e.  `∞-neighborhood of
Istart). Starting with Istart ∈ [0, 255]224×224×3, we run the
proposed attack, OIMO, in order to mimic the feature for 100
images. Table IV shows the success rate for different values
of . The high success rate shows that the proposed attack can
be applied for invertible architecture like i-RevNet as well.
This is because i-RevNet, despite being invertible, assigns
similar features to dissimilar images. Figure 6 shows one such
successful adversarial example.
 Success Rate
2 86.0 %
5 99.0 %
10 100.0 %
TABLE IV
SUCCESS RATE OF One Image Many Outputs FOR I-REVNET
5https://github.com/jhjacobsen/pytorch-i-revnet
7Fig. 6. Both the images are classified as ice bear by bijective i-RevNet.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a task agnostic adversarial
attack, Mimic and Fool. The proposed attack exploits the non-
invertibility of CNN-based feature extractors and is based on
the hypothesis that if two images are indistinguishable for
the feature extractor then they will be indistinguishable for
the model as well. The high success rate of Mimic and Fool
for three models across two tasks validates this hypothesis.
Since the three models use feature extractors varying from
shallow to very deep, the high success rate also shows that the
proposed attack works regardless of the depth of the feature
extractor. Also due to the task-agnostic nature, we need to run
the attack only at image-level which is a huge advantage in
terms of time saved for tasks involving multiple modalities
as input. We further propose a variant of Mimic and Fool,
named One Image Many Outputs, which generates natural-
looking adversarial images. The results for this variant of the
attack show that it is possible to mimic features of an arbitrary
image by making imperceptible changes to a fixed image as
well. This is an important insight into the nature of CNN-based
feature extractors. We also demonstrate the applicability of the
proposed attack for invertible architectures like iRevNet.
In the present version of Mimic and Fool, the adversary
needs information about the feature extractor of the model
and also needs access to the fine-tuned weights of the feature
extractor. We found that using pretrained instead of fine-tuned
weights leads to drop in success rate of the proposed attack.
This makes the proposed attack a gray-box attack. As part of
future work, one can explore different attack strategies which
will work successfully with just the pretrained weights.
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